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Abstract:
On 23 October 2001 the European Commission adopted a proposal for a directive for trade
in greenhouse gas emissions. Following the US experience of emissions trading systems, this
marks the first large-scale attempt to deploy this instrument of environmental policy in
Europe. The proposal places European climate protection policy on a completely new footing.
The prospects of its implementation have increased since the climate change conference in
Marrakech.
This paper introduces the draft directive and gives an initial economic appraisal. It concludes
that the directive deliberately – and wisely - limits the scope of the first trading phase starting
2005. Consequently, there is still considerable scope for increasing its efficiency (resulting
from gains from trading) in later phases, namely by extending both the number of participants
and the gases included. The number of participants in the first phase and the institutional
arrangements, however, appear sufficient to enable a liquid, functioning market. In this
respect, also the – politically difficult – decision to start with a compulsory system is to be
welcomed.
Important issues not yet sufficiently clarified include the concrete rules for defining the total
permit quantity issued to participants by each Member State, and whether other economic
sectors, which are to be treated by “other policies and measures”, will bear a comparable
burden. Furthermore, the essential questions of primary allocation and treatment of
newcomers – which are in principle left up to Member States – as well as the linkage of
emissions trading with existing policies affecting the participating sectors must be solved
before legal implementation is recommended.
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On 23 October 2001, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a directive for an EU-
wide greenhouse gas emissions trading (ET) system for private companies (European
Commission, 2001). It provides for the introduction of binding, absolute emission limits in
2005 for about 4,000–5,000 power stations and industrial plants with high energy
consumption, which are converted to emission allowances that can be traded between the
companies involved. These plants are responsible for 46 % of the total CO2 emissions in the
EU (ibid., p 10). This represents 38 % of all Kyoto gases. The idea is that these limits are
gradually decreased over the years so as to contribute to meeting the international emission
reduction targets of the EU and its Member States.
This first draft was preceded by a Green Paper in March 2000 (European Commission,
2000a), which raised core questions of a possible emissions trading scheme and invited
proposals. In addition, the topic was intensively dealt with by a working group within the
European Climate Change Programme comprising representatives of politics, industry,
research and NGOs. Finally, in September 2001 the Commission invited the Member States
and leading industrial associations to a consultation meeting to discuss an unpublished draft
(Vis, 2001), which was followed by the publication of the draft directive on 23 October 2001.
Together with the draft, the Commission also tabled a proposal for the EU’s ratification of the
Kyoto Protocol. Both these steps were taken just a few days prior to the Marrakech climate
change conference, and were meant to demonstrate the EU’s firm intention of using emissions
trading as one of the main instruments to achieve progress in climate protection. With
Marrakech paving the way for the Kyoto Protocol to be ratified, CO2 emissions trading in
Europe is now within reach.
This article starts by describing the circumstances under which the Commission decided to
come forward with an emissions trading proposal, and the related goals. Then it addresses five
distinct areas which in any system of tradable emission rights must be tackled (see Fromm
and Hansjuergens, 1996; Hansjuergens, 1998a). Firstly, the coverage of the trading system –
i.e. the economic actors obliged to hold permits – must be defined. Secondly, the total level of
permissible emissions has to be established. Thirdly, this total level of emissions must be
broken down and assigned to the individual businesses concerned (a process known as the
primary/initial allocation of emission rights). Fourthly, it must be ensured that sufficient
trading activity among the companies can emerge, which also includes avoiding impeding
influences of other regulations. And fifthly, an effective system of monitoring must be set up,
complete with appropriate sanctions imposed to combat non-compliance.
Furthermore, the paper comments on the extent to which the EU emission allowances could,
apart from enabling temporary (static) gains by way of trade, create (dynamic) incentives for
technological change, and it addresses the expected effects on competition between the
sectors concerned in Europe as well as the political acceptability.4
II. WHY EMISSIONS TRADING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?
Kyoto Commitments and recent trends in emissions
Under the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, for the first time the industrialised countries and those
with economies in transition committed themselves internationally and in a legally binding
way to limit their greenhouse gas emissions: by an average of 5.2 % by the years 2008–2012
compared to 1990 emission levels (see Article 3 and Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol). Annex
B of the Kyoto Protocol lists the commitment of each state. The EU took on a special role: in
addition to each EU Member State accepting an 8 % reduction target, the EU also assumed an
8 % target as a whole.
1
Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol allows states to club together and to share their joint
commitments differently from the targets stated in Annex B. The EU plans to make use of this
provision. In 1998 the Member States reached an agreement (‘burden sharing agreement’)
which contains much stricter reduction targets for some countries (over –20  % for
Luxembourg, Germany and Denmark) and lower goals for others, and even allows increases
of up to 27 % (for Portugal).
This strategy means, however, that all the Member States are jointly liable if some of them
cause the EU to miss its overall Kyoto target. As the recent monitoring report by the European
Environmental Agency (EEA, 2001) states and Table 1 illustrates, the recent trends indicate
that this could well be the case:
Table 1: EU Member States’ greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
1990 
1
1999 Change 1990-99 reduction target
Austria 76.9 79.2 2.6% -13%
Belgium 136.7 140.4 2.8% -7.5%
Denmark 70.0 73.0 4.0% -21.0%
Finland 77.1 76.2 -1.1% 0.0%
France 545.7 544.5 -0.2% 0.0%
Germany 1206.5 982.4 -18.7% -21.0%
Greece 105.3 123.2 16.9% 25.0%
Ireland 53.5 65.3 22.1% 13.0%
Italy 518.3 541.1 4.4% -6.5%
Luxembourg 10.8 6.1 -43.3% -28.0%
Netherlands 215.8 230.1 6.1% -6.0%
Portugal 64.6 79.3 22.4% 27.0%
Spain 305.8 380.2 23.2% 15.0%
Sweden 69.5 70.7 1.5% 4.0%
United Kingdom 741.9 637.9 -14.0% -12.5%
Total EU-15 4199 4030 -4.0% -8.0%
GHG emissions
Source: EEA (2001). NB: 
1 Regarding HFCs, PFCs and SF6, countries are free to choose 1995 as the base year
instead. This does, however, not significantly affect the total emissions (since these gases normally do not
account for more than 1% of Member States’ emissions).
While the joint development of all the Member States seems to indicate that half the Kyoto
commitment had been achieved by 1999 (- 4%), a closer look reveals that this development
was mainly due to considerable reductions in two large countries, namely Germany and the
                                                
1 Kraemer (2001) states that the 8  % commitment means a “real” reduction commitment – when taking
autonomous economic growth into account – of 13–14%.5
UK. The current performance of most other countries means they look set to fall far short of
their targets. The European Commission (2000b) recognises that any potential further
reductions in Germany and the UK will not be of the same extent
2. An initiative from the
European Commission seems therefore necessary to assist those Member States which are
likely to have problems in fulfilling their targets within the joint burden.
Here, emissions trading is seen as an inexpensive way of achieving emission reductions
(European Commission, 2001, p 2). This is because in all emissions trading systems, a trade
only takes place if both partners stand to gain from it, i.e. if it enables them both to cut their
total costs of compliance. The buyer reduces his costs directly because purchasing is in his
case cheaper than reducing emissions; the seller is over-compensated for reducing his
emissions by more than the amount to which he is committed and thereby reduces his overall
costs. In this way, emission reductions always take place wherever cheapest. It is thus
important that the potential trades do in fact take place; this happens when cost differences
between companies are large enough and the market works well in motivating trading. The
bigger the market, the higher the efficiency gains, and an EU-wide system offers greater
saving prospects than national systems would. As Kraemer (2001) notes, many small Member
States would probably not establish an emissions trading system on their own.
In addition, one central aim of an emissions trading system is to introduce an instrument that
ensures large industrial greenhouse gas emitters throughout the EU contribute to the national
emission reductions necessary, albeit with as little distortion to international competition as
possible (European Commission, 2001, p 2). In this respect, EU-wide emissions trading, even
if it leaves some implementation issues to the Member States, is regarded as superior to
national efforts in which the extent to which large emitters are affected will vary considerably.
In fact, it is doubtful whether many Member States would demand considerable contributions
from the large emitters without a co-ordinated initiative at EU level.
In general, intensifying the efforts to fulfil the EU Kyoto commitment improves the prospects
of the EU and its economies being better able to adopt even stricter targets in the long-term –
i.e. the commitments that look likely to be necessary in further international negotiation
rounds. Furthermore, this strategy looks apt to improve the prospects for developers of for
example energy-efficient technologies or technologies based on renewable energies as they
compete on the world market.
The idea of international emissions trading with the inclusion of companies
The Kyoto Protocol also allows states with emission obligations to trade their commitments
(or at least a part of them) among each other (Article 17 in conjunction with 3.10 and 3.11 of
the Kyoto Protocol).
3 As explained above, this trading may reduce compliance costs
considerably.
4 Although the Kyoto Protocol only mentions this trading for states (“Parties” to
the Protocol), suggestions have been made to allow companies to take part in such trading.
                                                
2 The emission reductions in Germany and the UK can to a considerable extent (roughly 50%, according to
Eichhammer  et al., 2001) be assigned to rather exceptional circumstances, such as the reunification in
Germany and the liberalisation of energy markets in the UK, both resulting in major fuel shifts, accompanied
by certain improvements in energy efficiency.
3 These countries can also acquire the right to reduce domestic commitments if credits are earned from
conducting emission-reducing projects in other committed countries (“Joint Implementation”, Article 6 in
conjunction with 3.10 and 3.11, or in a country with no obligations (developing countries or emerging
economies – “Clean Development Mechanism”, Article 12).
4  A 1997 comparison by Stanford Energy Modelling Forum which analysed the results of seven different
models revealed estimated cost savings of 20–90% compared to mere national reduction strategies (cf.
Dutschke and Michaelowa, 1998).6
The international negotiations after Kyoto to clarify unresolved questions have picked up this
option (see UNFCCC, 2001 and Butzengeiger et al., 2001). In this connection, states have to
authorise companies in their territory to trade “on their behalf” – since whatever the
companies do, the states remain responsible in terms of the commitments under the Kyoto
Protocol. The inclusion of companies is seen as reducing the costs of compliance for the states
because government-level trading does not equate marginal abatement costs on an emission
source level (FIELD, 2000, p 16), and including companies gives them much more flexibility
in deciding on where best to abate emissions (Tietenberg et al., 1998, p 22). This is based on
the belief that the companies are far more familiar with the details, cost implications etc. of
the range of emission reduction options and strategies available. 
5
Should an international market for emissions trading at the company level emerge as of 2008
– i.e. simultaneously with the first state level commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol –
participation by European businesses will be important in order to exploit the cost savings
(and the “rewards” for innovative behaviour) thus enabled, especially since all industrial
sectors are likely to have to contribute to states’ efforts to fulfil their Kyoto Protocol
commitments. Therefore, the European Commission aims to make learning effects possible
both for companies and for states (on how to implement the integration of companies in
international trading) before 2008. For this reason, an initial phase from 2005 with a
comparatively limited scope but on a mandatory basis is suggested.
III. HOW DOES THE EU PROPOSAL ADDRESS THE NECESSARY
IMPLEMENTATION STEPS?
The sectors involved
The bulk of EU greenhouse gas emissions (more than 80%
6) is made up of CO2 from the
combustion of fossil fuels – coal, mineral oil and natural gas – to use the energy released in
industry, transport, private households, and power generation. Since there is a comparatively
stable ratio between the amount of fuel burned (when the fuel type is known) and the resulting
CO2 emissions, a permit system can be applied to either the inputs (the fuels) or the outputs
(the emissions).
If the actual emissions are to be addressed, the target group has to be the emitters themselves.
This approach is called “downstream“. If inputs are to be targeted, the ideal approach from an
economic perspective would be to oblige the producers and importers of fossil fuels to hold a
volume of permits which equals the volume of emissions caused by the fuels they sell on the
domestic market.
7 This approach, known as the „upstream“ approach, would lead to fuel
producers and importers raising prices if fuel demand outstrips the permits available – which
ought to occur since the aim of climate policy is to reduce the emissions compared to a
“business-as-usual“ development. The effect on the fuel users’ side is similar to that of a
carbon tax: both prompt the fuel consumers to think about fuel-saving options or switching to
renewables (or from coal and oil to gas), which then reduces CO2 emissions (Hargrave, 1999,
                                                
5 Hahn and Stavins (1999), despite these aspects, question the belief that emissions trading will widely replace
other national policies in the participating countries. They conclude that the gains from international
emissions trading will be far less than predicted in much of the literature.
6 Excluding CFCs, which although greenhouse gases are not covered by the Kyoto Protocol, since they were
already addressed by the Montreal Protocol of 1988.
7  Since the various types of fossil fuels cause different amounts of CO2 when burned (in relation to the energy
transformed), an energy unit of lignite sold would accordingly need more permits than a unit of hard coal,
still more than a unit of fuel oil, and much more than a unit of natural gas.7
p 10).
8 This approach would be superior to one of fuel input permits for each fuel user,
because it involves far lower administrative costs for the state.
The major advantage of an upstream system is that it would allow sectors such as transport,
private households and service companies to be included, which would be too expensive –
and possibly too unreliable – to monitor in a downstream system (Hargrave, 1999, p 23). The
same applies to industrial sectors which are excluded in a downstream system or small firms
in sectors in which only the bigger companies are covered. Their inclusion in an upstream
system would enhance both the environmental effectiveness and the economic efficiency,
because the market would resolve “how big a share of the fuel cake“ each sector would
receive and how much each actor within the sectors would obtain.
On the other hand, an upstream approach would only achieve the claimed efficiency if firstly
the fuel producers and importers were able to pass on the price increases resulting from
allowance scarcity completely (e.g., if hard coal prices rose to the same extent relative to gas
prices to which their emission effects differ, and that this would be the case for every coal and
gas producer and customer), and secondly emitting companies reacted in the same way under
an upstream system as they do under a downstream regime. Regarding the first condition,
Heister, Michaelis et al. (1991, p 61) argue that prices are not passed on proportionally if
a) relative market power leads to parts of the additional burden being born by players in the
supply chain rather than the fuel users (it has to be born in mind that especially for industry
customers there is often no uniform fuel price, instead individual contracts exist which depend
partly on market power), and b) fuel suppliers can react by cross-subsidising fuel sales more
than they have possibly done before, e.g. to retain certain market shares. If this is true, it
would still lead to the overall emissions target being met, since the amount of emission rights
is fixed, but it would imply some fuel savings being done where it is not cheapest, resulting in
allocational efficiency losses. Regarding the second aspect of fuel consumer elasticity,
Hargrave (1999, p 24) states that while there is continuing debate on the scope, some energy
consumers do not react to price signals to the extent predicted by neoclassical economic
thinking due to high transaction costs, high discount rates and imperfect information. Under a
downstream system, emissions have to be monitored by the emitter so it is possible that
learning effects involved in quantifying the emissions facilitate the search for emission
reduction options. As stated above, the idea behind many of the proposals for including
companies into international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol was precisely to
make use of their expertise on emission reduction options and their cost implications. This is a
strong argument in favour of a downstream approach, which has to be weighted against the
greater outreach of an upstream approach.
More important even, the rising fuel prices in an upstream system imply higher total costs for
the emitters compared to a downstream system in which the permits are allocated without
charge (see section “Primary allocation of allowances”). Although the extent of the cost
increases depends on the ability of the fuel sellers to raise prices on the market, it is still
certain that costs for the fuel users will be higher, because under a downstream system a
purchaser only has to pay only for the emission amount he lacks for compliance, while under
an upstream he has to pay for his entire fuel purchase, resembling his total emissions. This
argument is likely to mean that only a downstream system can be politically accepted
(Kraemer, 2001, p 20).
                                                
8 The advantage compared to separate taxes for different sectors such as industry and transport – and also
compared to sectoral permit systems for fuel inputs – is that the upstream approach also equalises marginal
costs across the sectors, and so the fuels are used in those sectors where their productivity or benefits are
highest. Compared to a tax, the system also has the advantages that the total quantity of emissions defined by
the regulator will automatically be achieved and does not have to be reached by a “trial and error process”.8
Since a downstream system requires a considerable effort to quantify emissions and verify
these measurements, the Commission aims to restrict the sectors covered in the first
(“learning”) phase to those that include the biggest spot emitters. The draft directive envisages
a uniform procedure within the EU regarding the sectors to be included. No provision is made
for voluntary participation or opt-outs. In accordance with the sectors listed in the Green
Paper, Annex I of the draft proposes plants from the following industrial sectors:
•   Power and heat generation (in plants with a thermal input capacity exceeding 20 MW)
•   Mineral oil processing
•   Coke ovens
•   Metal processing
•   Cement and lime production
•   Other building material and ceramics
•   Glass and glass fibres
•   Paper and cellulose.
9
Minimum sizes (for energy capacity and/or production capacity, which are related to
emissions) apply before companies become involved. Initially, only CO2 emissions will be
included, i.e. emissions from both the combustion of fossil fuel and process-related emissions
(e.g., in the iron and steel industry). Other Kyoto gases and industrial sectors are to be
included at a later date (possibly as of 2008), provided emissions can be quantified with
sufficient reliability and that the costs of monitoring and measuring emissions are acceptable.
All relevant installations will need a “permit”, which in the language of the draft directive
means a general authorisation to trade their emission allowances
10. The permit must in
particular state how the emissions data are to be quantified and monitored (Articles 4–6 of the
EC draft directive). Even participants with no reduction obligations will be able to participate
in trade (Article 12 in conjunction with Article 3h). This means for instance that speculators
and NGOs (who may be interested in purchasing allowances in order to retire them) will also
be allowed to take part in trade.
The integration of the two project-related Kyoto mechanisms known as Joint Implementation
(projects mainly in transformation countries in Central and Eastern Europe) and Clean
Development Mechanism (projects in developing countries) is not yet decided. This is
because their “ecological integrity”
11 is considered uncertain and because several Member
States see the danger of “real” domestic emission avoidance measures being ousted.
Alongside the emissions trading proposal and the ratification proposal the Commission has
also adopted a Communication on the first phase of the ECCP (COM(2001) 580), in which a
further Commission proposal about linking emissions trading with project mechanisms is
                                                
9  Contrary to the original plan (European Commission, 2000a, p 15) the chemical industry was not included as
it comprises a large number of very different plants, the inclusion of which would have greatly increased the
administrative burden. Moreover, direct emissions by the chemical industry only represent about 1 % of the
total CO2 emissions in the EU. Refuse incineration was not included either, because the carbon content of the
incinerated refuse and thus the emissions cannot be correctly established, introducing a significant element of
uncertainty into the system.
10 Thus, in the wording of the draft directive, “allowances“ are the papers which state the authorisation to emit a
certain amount, while the permit is the general authorisation to take part in trading allowances. This is in
contrast to much of the economic literature, where permits are the tradable rights themselves.
11  I.e., it is uncertain whether they would result in the desired emission reductions or carbon sequestration
effects not only “on paper”, but in reality.9
announced for 2003 and the Commission would like to see this instrument in force by 2005,
in parallel with the emissions trading directive.
In an attempt to ensure easy application and to generate confidence in the system, it was
therefore deliberately decided to refrain from including other gases or sectors as well as small
companies which are below the threshold during the initial phase, despite the fact that this
might have increased the range of emissions trading and thus its allocational efficiency, and
may also have counteracted certain reservations related to competition (see below).
Consequently, the proposal covers, in the initial phase, just 46 % of CO2 emissions and 38 %
of the total Kyoto gas emissions (for all sectors including private households and transport).
Setting total emissions
The EC’s draft directive proposes a compulsory system covering absolute emissions
comprising the total emissions of the companies concerned. This is a traditional cap-and-trade
system in which all market participants are given permits to produce certain absolute levels of
emissions, and which allows for full trading from the very start (see Tietenberg et al., 1998).
(These emission rights are, as noted above, called “allowances”).
12
The upper limits (the caps for the total permissible emissions) have not yet been fixed. The
total share within the Member States’ reduction targets that has to be brought about by the
sectors participating in emissions trading has not been decided in the draft directive and is, in
principle, up to each Member State to decide. In other words, one of the most important
conditions for the concrete implementation of the emissions trading scheme is not yet – and
will probably not be - clearly defined by the European Commission. The only relevant
stipulations contained in the draft directive are to be found in its Annex III: for example that
the amounts allocated to private companies must be in line with the Kyoto Protocol and its
breakdown within the EU under the burden sharing agreement, as well as with the perceptible
emissions trend; that no installation shall receive more allowances than it is likely to need,
and in general that no undertakings or activities shall be unduly favoured (for details see
section “Primary allocation of allowances”).
The Member States have to draw up “national allocation plans” disclosing the total national
allowance amount and the allocation procedures. These plans are to be submitted to the
Commission and can be rejected by it. Apart from the criteria listed in Annex III, the
Commission may raise objections in the event that EU state aid rules are violated.
13 In order
to ensure that things go off smoothly, the Member States are to be directly involved in the
decision (Article 9, para. 2 and Article 23).
It will have to be seen how strict the Commission will be about demanding comparable
treatment in the various Member States. The possibilities to use a generous allocation of
emission rights to companies as a tool of “industrial policy” (in the sense of subsidising
domestic industries) are certainly reduced by the provisions stated above - whether they can
be eliminated remains to be seen. Hence, although the boundaries are known through the
                                                
12 Another approach is “credit trading systems”, in which not all emissions are changed into tradable rights, but
only the overfulfillment of certain target values. In this case, rights are only traded after the actual emissions
have been established and the excesses determined have been transformed into credits. The British
government has already introduced such a system as part of its national emissions trading in the flexibility
given to parties signing up to Climate Change Levy agreements. One important reason for the introduction of
this ex-post provision was the fact that only relative targets, i.e. emissions per amount produced of certain
products, are fixed in the present agreements, and that these can only subsequently be made tradable between
the sectors – by converting them into absolute emission amounts.
13 In addition, any company in Europe can introduce a complaint at the Competition DG ex-post.10
burden sharing agreement, one of the basic questions of the whole emission rights system
remains partly unresolved, at least for the time being. In this respect it seems also worth
noting that the European Commission has recently received the results of a project on Sectoral
Emission Reduction Objectives, which state, on the basis of estimations on the technological
potential, how many total reductions should be made by the various economic sectors
(industry, transport, households etc.) at the EU level when taking cost-effectiveness into
account (Blok et al., 2001). Possibly, this could serve as an indication for the Commission to
harmonise Member States’ actions as well as possible.
Primary allocation of allowances
There are various options when it comes to the primary allocation of emission allowances.
While from the perspective of environmental economics, auctioning is recommended in order
to ensure allocation based on economic urgency and to contribute to a functioning market,
political reasons probably demand a free allocation of allowances (“grandfathering”).
14
Therefore it is by no means surprising that in the projected CO2 emissions trading scheme,
too, the free allocation has been planned for the first phase starting in 2005. The emissions
trading programme does not explicitly demand free allocation in later stages; it merely
emphasises the need for a standard allocation procedure to prevent distortions of competition
among the companies from different Member States. However, it can be assumed that in
future stages, too, grandfathering will be the only feasible approach. The efficiency gains
from emissions trading will therefore only take effect when the emission allowances issued
are subsequently traded.
In the CO2 emissions trading scheme, primary allocation will have to be done by 2005 and
may be based on past emission levels. The exact procedure (determination of the base year,
possible consideration of expected increases in production etc.) will be up to each Member
State. Member States may also opt to base allocations on the voluntary agreements already
practised in some of them. The relative emission reduction targets fixed in the voluntary
agreement could then be multiplied by the expected output to form the basis for the allocated
(absolute) emission allowances. The companies of one industrial sector may also act jointly
(for instance through their industrial association) on the allowance market. However, this
leaves the question of whether the existing voluntary commitments will still allow internal
compensation among very efficient and less efficient participants or if they will have to be
amended with this in mind.
As the primary allocation of allowances in particular is a decisive criterion for equal
competition among companies in the European Union (CCAP, 1999), Annex III of the draft
directive introduces allocation criteria such as the consideration of emissions reductions
achieved in the past (“early action”) and technical possibilities to reduce emissions.
Furthermore, as noted above, every Member State has to present the planned allocation
procedure in a national allocation plan which may be rejected by the Commission and is also
considered by the other Member States.
Special mention should be made of two other criteria in Annex III:
•   Pursuant to Annex III, no. 5, no plant is to be granted more emission allowances than it
will probably need. If this criterion is interpreted very strictly and related to individual
plants, this may provoke conflict with the target “early action”, for taking into
                                                
14 Resistance results from the fact that auctioning would bring about a completely new distribution of emissions
rights. See Hansjuergens (1998b).11
consideration early action would normally result in some companies being allocated more
allowances than they need. Both targets are only compatible if the allocated allowances
for industry as a whole or for individual sectors are less than the total amount of required
allowances in 2005. Early action could then be rewarded by granting the companies in
question as many allowances as they need while other companies receive fewer than they
need.
•   Nevertheless, this criterion of Annex III, no. 5 may sharply restrict emissions trading, for
a functioning market presupposes that some companies have surplus emission allowances
resulting either from the cost-efficient avoidance of CO2 or from being granted more
allowances than they need at the very beginning.
•   In a system of the free allocation of allowances, new sources, too, play a particular role.
New emitters are plants which are newly erected (or expanded) after the initial allowance
allocation. Under the grandfathering approach, they are always at risk of being
disadvantaged compared to existing emitters. The directive proposal (Article 11, para. 3)
states that the Member States must grant new emitters access to the emission allowances,
but does not say in detail how this is to be done – a major issue that remains to be solved.
All in all, it must be assumed that the criteria of the primary allocation of emission allowances
will be the most controversial aspect of CO2 emissions trading in the Member States.
15
Safeguarding market functions
If emissions trading is to succeed, it is vital that emissions actually are traded on the market.
After all, trade is the “heart” of an emissions rights system. However, trade will only take
place if individual businesses start offering their superfluous allowances for sale in order to
earn a profit, and companies needing additional allowances are willing to buy them. This
should result in emissions being avoided wherever it is the least expensive, while the
allowances will migrate to the emitter who needs them most urgently. From an economic
viewpoint, this is the root of the cost effectiveness of emissions trading systems.
In CO2 emissions trading, the obligations of the companies participating will apply for the
years 2005–07, and then for periods lasting five years each (Article 11). As of 2008, this will
correspond to the obligation periods for states laid down in the Kyoto protocol. There is no
restriction on “banking” within the initial period (2005–07) and each subsequent period, and
amounts can also be carried forward from one five-year period to the next (Article 13, paras. 1
and 3). Limitations may only be imposed by Member States during the transition from the
initial to the second period (para. 2).
One important condition for participants’ confidence in the market is sufficient market
liquidity. This means that a sufficient number of allowances must always be available at any
one time so that potential buyers can find sellers and vice versa. It can be assumed that the
process of increasing liquidity will often be self-reinforcing: Once liquidity increases, the
costs for market services such as brokerage or exchanges will fall (as a result of economies of
scale), and the reduced costs for each transaction further increase the trading activity.
                                                
15 On March 8, 2002, the Commission has published a report on „Evaluation of Alternative Initial Allocation
Mechanisms...“ (Harrison/Radow, 2002) which contains a general comparison of different allocation
approaches and an analysis of the potential consequences for three sectors covered by the emissions trading
proposal – electric power and heat generation, paper and pulp, and cement. This study could assist Member
States in choosing an allocation method and also be used in the political debates over the allocation plans.12
The EC does not intend to set up intermediaries; this will be left to the markets. Auctions by
the environmental authorities such as those held in the USA under the acid rain programme to
set price signals (among other aims) are not intended in CO2 emissions trading. Indeed,
auctions of this nature seem unnecessary, since emissions trading in greenhouse gases has
been under discussion for a long time and experience can be gained on different existing
markets. In addition, price forecasts by brokers are already being published – including on the
basis of the national systems in the United Kingdom and Denmark.
However, market intermediaries can only arise if there is a sufficient number of active
participants. As mentioned above, the EC assumes that some 4,000–5,000 plants will be
covered by CO2 emissions trading. Since companies will only be selling those emission rights
which they no longer need, only a certain portion of all the emission rights allocated will
become available on the market. It should also be taken into account that companies usually
own more than one plant. Therefore, many emission rights will be exchanged internally,
resulting in cost savings being achieved without inter-company trade taking place.
16 The
number of companies participating in external trade (i.e. among different companies or
between brokers and companies) will therefore be less than 4,000–5,000. In actual fact the EC
expects company-internal trade to dominate during the first phase starting in 2005.
Furthermore, it should be taken into account that companies can act jointly on the emissions
market. If this option is taken, the number of “genuine” external transactions will be even
lower. Yet despite these limitations, the EU CO2 emissions trading can still be expected to
achieve a sufficiently high market volume. Indications of this are provided not only by
experience of the acid rain programme in the USA, where a fully functioning market emerged
in the first phase involving just a few hundred plants, but also (and much more convincingly)
by the experience of the RECLAIM programme in southern California, where despite the very
low number of participants a liquid market arose.
17
The plan to allow trading in absolute emissions should also have a positive impact on market
liquidity. It is questionable whether using relative emissions (i.e. emissions per unit of
production) as a basis of trade instead would be suitable for a cap-and-trade approach. After
all, in this case, all relative emissions would have to be multiplied by the actual production
quantity in order to enable trading between different sectors. This could either be done as a
formal trade based on expected  production quantities (in which the “real” number of
allowances allocated to each participant would be adapted ex-post according to actual
production-figures and so the actual total amount of emission rights on the market could only
be subsequently determined), or – as in the British system – the actual amounts could only be
formally bought and sold after being calculated ex post, i.e., after the expiry of each period. In
this system, beforehand, merely informal futures deals would be possible. It seems unlikely
that the minimum liquidity needed for a functioning market could be achieved with such a
system.
Judging by the experience of the US systems and according to the industries concerned,
simple and transparent rules are vital; market restrictions would hamstring trading. The EC’s
draft makes provision for the complete fungibility of emission rights. For example, no
geographical or temporal limitations are planned within the first two periods (2005–07 and
2008–12). Nor are they necessary, since greenhouse gases do not usually harbour the threat of
regional or temporal hot spots. Moreover, the EC stipulates that Member States may not
introduce their own restrictions on trading (Article 12, para. 1).
                                                
16  Regarding the same effect on the US permit market for sulphur dioxide emissions, see Burtraw (1996).
17  For very comprehensive and up-to-date discussions of the US emissions trading experiences, see for example
Ellerman et al. (2000) and Kosobud (2000).13
Avoiding impeding regulations
A successful emission rights market needs more than just an institutional framework. It must
also be ensured that no other legal regulations exist which impair the function of the market.
Such restrictions include certain laws related to the Kyoto gases or the use of energy.
With a few exceptions, the sectors proposed by the emissions trading directive are identical
with those contained in the EU-IPPC directive (European Commission, Council Directive
96/61/EC), which contains standards mainly based on the “best available technology (BAT)”.
Since this also includes energy efficiency and greenhouse gas emissions, the directive is in
potential conflict with CO2 emissions trading: the latter would explicitly aim to allow
installations not to fulfil BAT standards, in order to make use of gains from trading, while the
IPPC BAT requirement inhibits exactly this element (Rehbinder and Schmalholz, 2002, p 8).
Therefore, according to Art. 25 of the draft directive on emissions trading, all corresponding
paragraphs of the IPPC directive are to be amended in favour of free emissions trading unless
regional emission concentrations necessitate their retention. However, the draft directive also
contains, in Art. 2.2, a provision that energy efficiency is excepted from Art. 25 provisions,
and must therefore still be treated according to the IPPC rule.
This can be justified on the one hand since Koch/Wienecke (2001) rightly point out that
energy efficiency is a goal which goes beyond saving CO2 emissions, not least because of its
role for pursuing the precautionary principle (which involves saving natural energy resources
as well as reducing the risks of potential new, so far unknown environmental problems which
CO2 emissions also once were). Furthermore, the Commission aims at ensuring that the
manufacturing companies covered by the proposal – such as paper and pulp or iron and steel –
will not only reduce their direct emissions but also use electric power efficiently (personal
information Zapfel, March 4, 2002), which is only indirectly motivated by the proposed
emissions trading based on direct emissions – namely via increased electricity prices.
On the other hand, keeping the energy efficiency requirement for both the generation and the
consumption of power would clearly limit the potential for emissions trading. For example,
measures for fuel conversion would be disadvantaged compared to energy efficient power
generation techniques. Such a restriction would be detrimental since it would limit the
function of the emission rights market. This problem can be alleviated to a certain degree by
adapting administrative practice (being less stringent in forming minimum standards, where
necessary (information Zapfel, March 4, 2002). Nevertheless, weighing the arguments, the
authors believe that the final version of the directive should in any case lift the energy
efficiency requirement for power production. It might, if practicable, retain it for power
consumption, but only with minimum standards. In general, whenever in doubt, it should
grant clear priority to the “free play of market forces”.
Other national and EU policies may result in similar obstacles. Regarding renewable energy
sources (RES) in electricity production, the draft directive therefore excludes the possibility of
counting within emissions trading those RES which are promoted by Member States in
pursuing their targets according to Community RES legislation (Annex III, no. 4). Potential
conflicts with policies such as the EU energy taxation directive under discussion also need to
be resolved.14
Controls and sanctions
Controls and sanctions play an important part in the functioning of the market. Without
sufficient controls, an emission rights market would be doomed to failure. After all, it could
no longer be ensured that the emission rights listed on allowances correspond to actual
emissions. This would result in not only the violation of ecological goals, but also in a
considerable loss of confidence on the part of market participants – and in the worst case in
the complete collapse of the emission rights market. Against this background, accurate
measurements of emissions and the comparison of actual emissions with emission rights as
stated on allowances is imperative for the entire system to function.
In CO2 emissions trading, the quantification of emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels
is normally based on calculation of the fuel input amounts using average emission factors. By
contrast, process-related emissions are to be calculated using either direct measurement or
calculation based on the amount produced or the quantities of fuel used. Annex IV contains
guidelines which are to be further particularised by a regulatory committee. Above all,
generally valid emission factors are to be specified. The emission volumes will then be
verified by an independent institution (which may be state-run or private; this is up to each
Member State). If a company violates the monitoring or verification requirements, its permit
may be withdrawn until the situation has been rectified (Article 15).
It is also vital that the state keeps tabs on sales and purchasing activities to ensure that the
same emission rights are not sold several times over. Therefore, in the emissions trading
systems in the USA, a register (Allowance Tracking System) is used to keep records of
participants’ emission total rights and their trading activities. Such a system is also to be
adopted in the planned EU system.
Once the actual emissions have been determined at the end of the year, companies have three
months to make up for any excess emissions compared to their allowed limits (Article 12). If
after this three-month period the actual emissions still exceed those stated in the emissions
allowances, sanctions are due. To generate the deterrence required for the emission rights
market to function, the sanctions must be sufficiently severe and must also be automatically
applied when necessary, without scope for negotiations. Furthermore, the level of sanctions
can be used to reduce cheating. The proposal in the draft directive is for the sanctions to be
twice the average allowance price of the previous year, albeit no less than €50 (as of 2005) or
€100 (as of 2008) per tonne of CO2 (Article 16). This level appears to be more than sufficient.
Furthermore, the fact that excess emissions must in addition be completely avoided in the
following period is also to be welcomed. It is furthermore important that sanctions be equal
within the whole trading area – in this case, across Member States - to make sure that
emission rights are not systematically sold abroad by companies in the country with the
lowest level of sanctions. This, too, is specifically laid down in the directive.
In addition to institutional measures to secure implementation, the temporary limitation to
CO2 emissions and to sources which can be quantified sufficiently reliably can be regarded as
another advantage contributing to a functioning market. This is why it was decided not to
make the allocation efficiency as high as it could have been.15
IV. COST SAVINGS, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITION
Cost savings and innovations
In addition to the profits achieved by trading in existing differences between allowed and
actual emissions (static efficiency), the prospect of transforming future emissions savings into
additional revenue from the sale of emission rights and avoiding purchases could also lead to
major changes in the manner of production as well as the usage of technical innovations
(dynamic efficiency). One crucial factor is just how far ahead companies can plan their
emission rights trading. Particularly in the sectors covered by the system, this is an especially
significant aspect, for the investments involved are often of a long-term nature. Also, they are
often related to other production processes and so need to be co-ordinated with them. This
causes problems if the other production processes are subject to different investment cycles.
The following aspects are especially important for long-term planning certainty:
•   Market transparency: Initial price information is already being provided by brokers. It is
being calculated on the basis of simulations and in the meantime also in the first
“genuine” deals being executed in anticipation of companies’ imminent obligations.
•   Constancy of price development: Market liquidity and control mechanisms are the basic
essentials needed for a functioning market. They also affect the constancy of price
development – i.e. the absence of high and erratic price fluctuations.
•   Markets for derivatives: “Hedging” transactions like forwards and options open up
information on prices expected by other participants, and also enable yields or revenue to
be secured in the future. These markets develop, too, as long as the permit market is large
enough. However, not even a forward market extends infinitely into the future, and so
participants will have to act strategically by themselves for periods stretching far ahead.
•   Clear long-term political environment: Businesses depend on clear, long-term political
strategies, especially for longer periods. It may be disadvantageous that some conditions
of trade for the later phases (as of 2008) – such as allocation procedures, the extent to
which project-related schemes can be counted, the inclusion of other Kyoto gases – will
not have been fixed when the first period starts in 2005.
The latter factors are especially likely to increase uncertainty during the first phase. This may
to some extent reduce the emergence and market penetration of promising technologies as of
2005.
Two other factors seem to indicate that allowance prices will be little more than modest as of
2005, curtailing the innovation incentive. Firstly, despite the above-mentioned clause that
companies should not be granted more emission rights than they need, in the uncertain initial
phase as of 2005 there will be an incentive for the Member States to generously calculate the
quantities of allowances to be allocated. Secondly, the inclusion of the EU accession
candidates in emissions trading could open up a whole new can of worms. By setting an early
base year – and this would be consistent with the above-mentioned consideration of early
action – emissions reductions achieved in the early 1990s as a result of economic
transformation could lead to a significant additional supply of emission rights – although this
potential appears to be reduced thanks to EU state aid rules.
On the other hand, merely the political signal generated by emissions trading and the
anticipated intensification of the aims in the following periods could create a major, long-term
incentive, which would overshadow the short-term limitations.16
Competition among the sectors concerned
As stated above ,the rule of allocating allowances free of charge (“grandfathering”) has to be
applied by all Member States in the initial period in order to allow free competition among the
various sectors concerned. Nevertheless, we will have to wait and see exactly how (according
to which criteria) this allocation procedure is organised by the Member States. Only then can
the extent to which a level playing field has emerged be assessed. Creating a compatible
initial situation is of enormous importance – not least on the electricity market, which is
characterised by a homogeneous product and intense competition. However, if this equal
treatment is achieved, emissions trading may be vastly superior to an uncoordinated approach
by the Member States with respect to the effects of competition – and may also greatly reduce
the compliance costs of all companies, which will be advantageous in competition with non-
European companies.
18 Another very important factor is how companies below the minimum
threshold size and in other sectors are subject to “compatible” national policies as called for in
the draft directive. This is an area in which the EC’s influence is limited (Kraemer, 2001).
As mentioned above, the draft does not specify in detail how allocation to new emitters in
each Member State should take place. Judging by the procedures applied in the USA, it is
almost inevitable that new emitters will be at a disadvantage for a while if the ecological
effectiveness is not to be reduced. More important, different treatment in each Member State
may even result in greater inequalities. On the other hand, Article 11, para. 4 of the draft
envisages the issue of new allowances annually, and so equal allocation for new emitters is
possible no later than a year after new plants have been built.
V.  POLITICAL CONSENSUS ACHIEVABLE
Following the conclusion of the consultations, the EC perceives general acceptance to prevail
regarding the full introduction of EU-wide emissions trading in the near future (Vis, 2001, p
2). However, whether it will actually be implemented in the form envisaged is difficult to
predict at the moment. Factors indicating that implementation will not be as smooth as desired
include the provision of companies’ compulsory participation as of 2005, the reference to
absolute obligations, and the question of conformity with existing national climate policies
(especially national emissions trading):
•   One of the key topics of discussion is whether emissions trading should be compulsory for
companies before 2008 – i.e. before EU Member States become subject to international
obligations. Industry fears this will place unnecessary restrictions on commercial
decisions, and even the German government is in favour of a voluntary pilot phase lasting
three years. By contrast, the EC would like to implement trade which is as realistic as
possible before 2008 in order to put Member States on the right track for 2008/2012, and
to give politicians and the companies involved the time needed to acquire the necessary
experience (ibid., p 2). For this purpose, all companies listed in Annex I are to be involved
from the very start. The reduction and learning effects resulting from voluntary trading
could indeed be limited, partly because of the risk that mainly only companies interested
in selling would take part (ibid., p 2).
                                                
18 However, this cannot answer the question of whether the greater involvement of industry in the reduction of
greenhouse gases in the EU (be it through emissions trading or other stricter measures compared to the status
quo) would place it at a disadvantage compared to non-European competitors. This answer depends on the
activities taken by other states to achieve national climate protection aims.17
•   Reference to absolute emissions is regarded by industry as a possible obstacle to economic
growth if the growth rates are so high that advances in efficiency are “overcompensated
for” by increases in quantity, causing allowance prices to rise. But even if the favourable
production situation only affected individual companies or sectors and allowances could
be bought cheaply, their purchase would still mean an additional burden for the companies
and sectors concerned. This problem does not affect the system of voluntary obligations
currently in force in Germany. As a result, many industrial associations continue to call
for emissions trading on the basis of relative emissions, i.e. emissions per unit of
production quantity or – if possible – the retention of voluntary agreements.
•   Another problem is the linking of CO2 emissions trading with existing national emissions
trading systems, especially with the system currently being implemented in the UK. One
main difference between the two concepts is the way in which emissions caused by power
generation are counted. Whereas the EU’s draft directive envisages power producers
being included in trading as a greenhouse gas emitting sector, in the British system power
producers are to be excluded (see DEFRA 2001). Instead, (industrial) power consumers
are to be included with the emissions they cause indirectly on the part of power producers.
In addition to certain advantages of the indirect approach, which are however also beset
by a number of disadvantages,
19 one reason why this decision was taken was that it could
be better reconciled with the “Negotiated Agreements” recently reached with industry.
The British government is unlikely to want the political concept only just politically
agreed and due to take effect in 2002 to be completely reorganised as of 2005.
20
One important factor which may smooth the introduction of CO2 emissions trading is the free
initial award of emission allowances. The proposal establishes a number of basic principles,
even though the exact allocation method in the Member States is still likely to be the subject
of political argument. Free initial award is designed to make emissions trading an acceptable
instrument compared to taxation solutions because in the case of environmental taxes,
emitters always have to pay for the entire volume of emissions left over (Hansjuergens
1998b).
The fact that emissions trading is viewed critically by parts of German industry can probably
be attributed to comparisons being drawn with German environmental taxes in their current
form (with lower tax rates and rebates for industry) rather than comparing the general merits
and disadvantages of the respective instruments. Higher environmental taxes or emissions
trading would not be necessary if industry’s contributions to reducing emissions could be met
with the existing policies, such as the current voluntary agreements in several EU countries.
Not least in Germany, which looks on track to meet ist target under the EU burden sharing
agreement with the existing efforts, this argument is often stated. However, one also has to
                                                
19 The main advantage of directly integrating power producers is the much simpler administration required.
Indirect emissions pose thorny problems such as the source of electricity purchased, the dates of purchase,
and the emission factors used in calculation, etc. Directly involving electricity producers provides a direct
incentive to reduce emissions during generation. On the other hand, there is only a direct incentive for
electricity customers to save power if a procedure considering indirect emissions is applied. If power
producers are obliged to reduce emissions, the incentive to save energy among power consumers depends on
the extent to which permit costs are actually reflected in electricity prices, and whether consumers regard
these additional costs in the same way as if they themselves were involved in emissions trading. Furthermore,
as long as the EU accession states are not integrated, electricity imports from these countries will cause a
‘leakage’ effect. Ultimately, directly involving power producers will result in cogeneration (combined heat
and power) plants being placed at a certain disadvantage (Vis, 2001, p 5). Furthermore, the indirect approach
would result in distortions in a fully liberalised EU power market.
20 Another problem may also arise from the British government already planning to integrate project-related
measures (including Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism) as of 2005 (See DEFRA
(2001) - namely if the EU emissions trading would indeed start without their integration.18
view potentially stricter international goals in the long-term, i.e. after 2012. Assuming that
significant reductions going beyond “business-as-usual” developments cannot be achieved
solely by the current voluntary system and industrial co-operation (for Germany there is
reason to follow this suggestion), gaining experience from emissions trading as soon as
possible would appear logical. It must of course be admitted that the question of how
emissions trading is to be combined with the other existing and planned instruments of
climate protection (in Germany, next to the voluntary agreements and the “ecological tax
reform”, co-generation support policies and the Renewable Energy Act (which grants grid
access for RES at fixed tariffs), at EU level the harmonisation of mineral oil taxes and the
proposed energy taxation directive) provokes a degree of uncertainty and scepticism.
VI. FINAL REMARKS
It can be seen from the draft directive just how much store those behind it set by producing a
solution which is as stringent as it is clear. For this purpose, they developed an extensive yet
not overly complex system of commitments based on absolute and direct emissions. It was
also the main reason why project-related measures and other gases apart from CO2 were left
out. Only a few regulations limit the system’s fungibility, and the number of participants as
well as the controls and sanctions envisaged hold out the promise of both a functioning
market and high ecological effectiveness.
On the other hand, to compensate for the binding, absolute targets, the strictness of these
targets may be somewhat reduced by Member States through generous allowance allocation,
hampering to a certain extent the attainment of the Commission’s goals. Therefore one crucial
aspect is whether Annex III can bring about an effective policy. The planned systematic
reduction in permissible emissions over time mentioned by Commissioner Wallstroem at the
press conference to present the draft directive is not explicitly contained in the draft. It should,
however, be assumed that the Member States will all continuously reduce the emission
allowances issued in order to slowly but surely reach their national reduction targets.19
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